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 Preface 
  
First of all, citing the presence of Almighty God, Andalas Journal of International Studies 
(AJIS) presents the Third Volume, No. 1, May 2014. Our goal in published this journal is to 
disseminate the results of the researchers’ works with various topics and approaches in order 
to contribute to the development of International Studies both theoretically and practically.  
Entering the third year of the publication of this journal, we are grateful and appreciate the 
interest and delivery of incoming papers. At this volume, there are five papers which is a 
major theme in volume 3 number 1 is more emphasis on policy issues, especially issues 
related to the Chinese government's policy in dealing with disputes such as that written by 
Kevin Ramadan Sandy, entitled Solving the South China Sea Crisis: A Recommendation for 
Indonesia and by Trio Sirmareza by lifting the title Popular Nationalism in Chinese Foreign 
Policy towards Japan in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute. 
In the next paper, Maksum Ali elaborated on The Free Press in Indonesia as Human Security: 
A Preliminary Analysis. Then Sofia Trisni entitled bythe performance of the Free Aceh 
Movement (GAM) as a Ruling Government 2007-2012. And the last written by Muhammad 
Syaban with title Disaster Governance in South-East Asia. 
With the biggest gratitude, we would also like to thank the editorial board, who has worked 
hard in the preparation of these papers, so in the end it can come up to be a printed journal. 
 
       
         Editorial Team  
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Solving the South China Sea Crisis:  A Recommendation for Indonesia 
 
Kevin Ramadhan Sandy 
 
  Abstract 
The main purpose of this paper is to recommend to Indonesia to maintain its national interest 
of a unified ASEAN on the South China Sea disputes with four policy recommendations. The 
failure of the 2012 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting was observed as many analysts as the start of 
a crack in ASEAN as a regional group. With Cambodia’s acting as China’s proxy in the 
meeting, ASEAN failed to address the issue and to put it in the Joint Communique, although 
Vietnam and Philippines have insisted the chair to do so. This event led to the rise of 
suspicions from ASEAN claimant states towards Cambodia and China’s intention. 
Furthermore, this becomes a proof that ASEAN could no longer be independent as a regional 
group as China has increased its economic leverage on Cambodia. At the same time, 
Philippines and Vietnam have increased their bilateral ties with the United States, hoping to 
increase their leverage and capability vis-à-vis China. Thus, ASEAN is in an unstable state 
with high possibility of it to be divided into two blocs with the South China Sea still 
unresolved. One of Indonesia’s main foreign policy interests is a unified, centralized and 
independent ASEAN as a regional bloc. President Yudhoyono and Foreign Minister 
Natalegawa reflected this by underscoring the importance of ASEAN and the need to resolve 
the dispute as soon as possible before further tension occurred. In this case, Indonesia should 
try to act as the mediator to solve this issue as a neutral player. 
 
Keywords: Indonesia, ASEAN, China, South China Sea, Diplomacy 
 
 
ASEAN’s unity, solidarity and centrality 
are threatened by a possible intervention 
by greater powers due to the conflict in 
South China Sea. On July 2012, for the 
first time in its history, the ASEAN 
Foreign Ministers’ Meeting had failed to 
issue a Joint Communique, a set of 
statements that point out a set of collective 
cooperation which ASEAN member states 
have been working together in order to 
achieve a common ground and goal. 
Cambodia, accused of being a proxy to 
China, rejected to mention the South China 
Sea dispute in the communique, although 
the Philippines insisted that the 
communique should reflect the ministers 
discussion of the confrontation between 
the Philippines and China at Scarborough 
Shoal and Vietnam wanted the declaration 
to address the Exclusive Economic Zones 
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(EEZ).
1
 Cambodia, rejecting references to 
South China Sea and EEZ, argued that 
those issues are bilateral issues which 
could not be discussed in an ASEAN joint 
statement.
2
 In the end, the forum 
concluded that there would be no Joint 
Communique following the meeting. 
The result of the meeting clearly showed 
that China has influenced last year’s 
ASEAN agenda through its growing 
influence in Cambodia. China favoured 
bilateral negotiations with Southeast Asian 
claimants, while the Philippines, Vietnam, 
Malaysia and Brunei preferred multilateral 
negotiation through the ASEAN Regional 
Forum.
3
 China’s soft power in Cambodia 
has undermined ASEAN’s unity as Phnom 
Penh tilted to Beijing. Not only in 
Cambodia, China – through its diplomatic 
efforts and economic assistance in trade 
                                                 
1
 Ernest Bower, ‘China reveals its hand on ASEAN 
in Phnom Penh’, East Asia Forum, 
(2012):<http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/0
7/28/china-reveals-its-hand-on-asean-in-
phnom-penh/ (accessed on 20 December 
2013). 
2
Ibid. 
3
 Khean Un, ‘Cambodia in 2012: Beyond the 
Crossroads?’, Asian Survey 53, No. 1 (2013): 
147. 
and investment – has also drawn Burma 
and Laos into its orbit.
4
 This threatened the 
unity and centrality of ASEAN, with the 
Philippines and Vietnam are tightening 
their relationship with the United States.
5
 
This paper will provide an analysis of the 
crisis of trust in ASEAN and the crisis of 
ASEAN-China relations. Moreover, this 
paper will provide a critical background of 
ASEAN’s significance to Indonesia. 
Lastly, it will provide four policy 
recommendations for Indonesia to help 
resolve the dispute on the South China 
Sea. 
What’s in the South China Sea? 
South China Sea has great economic 
stakes. It is a rich fishing grounds and a 
potential source of hydrocarbons, 
particularly natural gas.
6
 Moreover, it has 
become one of the busiest sea lanes in the 
                                                 
4
 Khean Un, p. 147. 
5
 Michael Wesley, ‘What’s at stake in the South 
China Sea?’, Lowy Institute for International 
Policy, Strategic Snapshot 11 (2012): 3. 
6
 US Energy Information Administration, ‘South 
China Sea’, (2013): 
<http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-
topics.cfm?fips=SCS> (accessed on 28 
December 2013). 
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world, with more than a quarter of the 
world’s trade pass through the lane each 
year.
7
 Furthermore, according to the US 
Energy Information Administration (EIA), 
it is estimated that the possible oil reserves 
in the area is as high as 213 billion 
barrels.
8
 The EIA also estimates that the 
area may also contain natural gas reserves 
about 900 trillion cubic ft. which is the 
same as the proven reserves in Qatar.
9
 
With great economic stakes in South 
China Sea, no wonder that China, in the 
age of growing need of resources demand 
and scarcity, is drawing the biggest lane to 
claim the sea. As China is now importing 
58 per cent of its oil and 22 per cent of its 
gas, China feels the need to secure its 
energy demands.
10
 Since 2007, China has 
taken a number of action to assert its 
                                                 
7
 Alice Ba, ‘Staking Claims and Making Waves in 
the South China Sea: How Troubled Are the 
Waters?’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 33, 
No. 3 (2011): 170. 
8
 US Energy Information Administration, ‘South 
China Sea’, (2013): 
<http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-
topics.cfm?fips=SCS> (accessed on 28 
December 2013). 
9
Ibid. 
10
 Lowell Dittmer, ‘Asia in 2012: The Best of a 
Bad Year?’, Asian Survey 53, No. 1 (2013): 7. 
claim: increasing seizures of Vietnamese 
fishing boats, warning Western energy 
companies not to work with Vietnam in 
exploring or drilling the disputed waters, 
announcing plan to develop the disputed 
islands as tourist destinations, and 
skirmishes with the Philippines, 
Vietnamese and Malaysian forces.
11
 
ASEAN between China and the United 
States 
When China reveals its hand on ASEAN 
in Phnom Penh last year, there is concerns 
that ASEAN will be divided into two blocs 
between the US and China. In 2011, the 
confrontation between Philippines and 
Chinese vessels in the South China led to a 
greater Philippines-US military 
cooperation and lent urgency to Armed 
Forces of Philippines (AFP) naval 
upgrades.
12
 Furthermore Vietnamese 
                                                 
11
 BBC, ‘Q&A: South China Sea dispute’, BBC 
Website, 
(2013):<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
asia-pacific-13748349> (accessed on 24 
December 2013). 
12
 Thomas Lum, ‘The Republic of the Philippines 
and US Interests’, Congressional Research 
Service (2012), 
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leaders have sought to upgrade relations 
with the United States due to the desire for 
continued access to the US market and the 
worries about China’s expanding influence 
in Southeast Asia and China’s call for 
international bid for oil exploration in the 
disputed area.
13
 Vietnam also convened 
and secured a seat for US representative in 
the first ever ASEAN Defense Ministers’ 
Meeting +8, where US Secretary of 
Defense, Robert Gates, reiterated US 
concerns about China’s actions in the 
South China Sea.
14
 However, Vietnam is 
also being careful in choosing its foreign 
policy, because its relation with China is 
also one of its most important bilateral 
relations.
15
 
As mentioned before, while the 
Philippines and Vietnam are tightening 
their relationship with the United States, 
                                                                      
<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33233.pdf
> (accessed on 28 December 2013): 24. 
13
 Mark Manyin, ‘US-Vietnam Relations in 2013: 
Current Issues and Implications for US 
Policy’, Congressional Research Service 
(2014), 
<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40208.pdf> 
(accessed on 26 December 2013): 2. 
14
 Manyin, p. 7. 
15
 Manyin, p. 2. 
China is spreading its soft power on 
Cambodia. Since 1997, China has offered 
$10 billion in loans and grants to 
Cambodia, compared to a total of around 
$12 billion from Cambodia’s other 
development partners.
16
 In September 
2012, two months after the failure of Joint 
Communique in the 2012 ASEAN 
meeting, the Chinese government offered 
$523 million in loans and grants to 
Cambodia, which is described by Khean 
Un as “helping Beijing maintain friendly 
relations with ASEAN”.17 Also in the 
same year, Cambodia hosted former 
President Hu Jintao and premier Wen 
Jiabao to pronounce a new trade and aid 
agreements.
18
 In the future, it is very likely 
that Cambodia would become more tilted 
towards Beijing as it offered extensive 
economic and political aids without 
demanding any costly prerequisite. The 
loans and grants from China earned the 
ruling party in Cambodia, the CPP, to earn 
                                                 
16
 Khean Un, pp. 147-148. 
17
 Khean Un, p. 148. 
18
Ibid. 
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much credibility the many infrastructural 
projects are made possible by Chinese 
aid.
19
 Ciorciari also added that Cambodia’s 
elites also enjoy an influx of resources that 
facilitate personal enrichment and near-
term political entrenchment.
20
 
The unity, solidarity and centrality of 
ASEAN are threatened in front of external 
power. Cambodia’s political and economic 
structures evolve in a way that renders the 
country to be the target to Chinese 
pressure. The division in ASEAN external 
position will make ASEAN weaker in 
front of China. The US, with its plan to re-
pivot to Asia, continues to stress that the 
South China Sea dispute is one of its 
interests, although it doesn’t recognize the 
sovereignty of the disputed area.
21
 At the 
                                                 
19
Ibid. 
20
 John Ciorciari, ‘China and Cambodia: Patron and 
Client?’, International Policy Centre, Working 
Paper Series No. 121 (2013), 
<http://ipc.umich.edu/working-
papers/pdfs/ipc-121-ciorciari-china-cambodia-
patron-client.pdf> (accessed on 29 December 
2013): 38. 
21
 Munir Majid, ‘Southeast Asia between China and 
the United States’, London School of 
Economic and Political Science, IDEAS report 
No. 15 (2012), 
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/rep
same time, Beijing has been suspicious of 
what it perceives as Washington’s 
interference in this dispute. Military 
conflict between claimants is often ruled 
out as an option by local policy-makers as 
well as analysts and experts.
22
 However, 
by analysing the last disputes in the region, 
it is obvious that there is absolutely a lack 
of options as how to solve the problem and 
prevent future’s conflict. Since November 
2012, there has not been a single reported 
incident in the South China.
23
 However, 
this doesn’t prove that there will be no 
more incidents in the future which could 
lead to a higher height of tensions than 
before. The same could be said when the 
issue of South China Sea didn’t appear to 
be the headline since 2002, but it did in 
early 2012 when China and Philippines 
                                                                      
orts/pdf/SR015/SR015Majid-China-vs-
US.pdf> (accessed on 23 December 2013): 27. 
22
 Richard Turcsanyi, ‘The Long Term Perspective 
of the South China Sea Dispute’, Institute of 
Asian Studies Policy Paper (2013), 
<http://cenaa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/Policy-Paper-IAS-
Turcsanyi.pdf> (accessed on 24 December 
2013): 1. 
23
 BBC, ‘Q&A: South China Sea dispute’, BBC 
(2013), <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
asia-pacific-13748349> (accessed on 24 
December 2013). 
Kevin Ramadhan Sandy |Solving the South China Sea Crisis: A Recommendation for Indonesia 
 
Andalas Journal of International Studies|Vol 3 No 1 Mei Tahun 2014 39 
 
engaged in a maritime standoff.
24
 
Therefore, while the tensions have stopped 
for now, it is by no mean the end of the 
rows. Michael Wesley argues that, ‘if left 
unaddressed, the dynamics in the South 
China Sea could return Southeast Asia to 
the bad old days of inter-state divisions, 
domestic instability and competitive great-
power interventions’.25 
The Significance of ASEAN to 
Indonesia 
ASEAN has always been very important to 
Indonesia. Thus, ASEAN’s centrality, 
solidarity and unity have always been one 
of Indonesia’s main interests. Indonesia 
has always regard ASEAN as the main 
pillar for its foreign policy. The President 
of Indonesia Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
and foreign affairs minister Marty 
Natalegawa emphasized this by 
underlining Indonesia’s commitment to 
position ASEAN as the country’s main 
                                                 
24
Ibid. 
25
 Wesley, p. 3. 
venue for foreign policy.
26
 In regard to the 
South China Sea, President Yudhoyono 
has stated that it is Indonesia’s priority to 
make progress to resolve the issue.
27
 The 
principle of ‘ASEAN Centrality’ has also 
been consistently applied by Indonesia in 
the light of China’s economic and political 
rising.
28
 Of course, the principle of 
ASEAN Centrality is reflected in 
Indonesia ‘free and active’ foreign policy 
and the so-called ‘Natalegawa Doctrine’, 
which sees the international politics with 
the concept of ‘dynamic equilibrium’.29  
Dynamic equilibrium is of course marked 
by the absence of domination of any single 
great power, where countries engage with 
one another in a mutually beneficial and 
                                                 
26
 Syamsul Hadi, ‘Indonesia, ASEAN, and the Rise 
of China: Indonesia in the Midst of East Asia’s 
Dynamics in the Post-Global Crisis World’, 
International Journal of China Studies 3, No. 2 
(2012): 155. 
27
 Hadi, p. 159. 
28
Ibid. 
29Ahmad Umar, ‘A critical reading of ‘Natalegawa 
doctrine’’, Jakarta Post (2011), 
<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/01
/07/a-critical-reading-
%E2%80%98natalegawa-
doctrine%E2%80%99.html> (accessed on 25 
December 2013). 
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peaceful way.
30
 Therefore, Indonesia 
always pursues regionalism with ASEAN 
as its core. Bantaro Bandoro, the editor of 
Indonesia Quarterly, wrote:  
‘Indonesia burst forth as a strategic 
regional player more than 40 years 
ago when the region saw the 
establishment of ASEAN. Our 
influence touched almost every 
aspect of the region. Southeast Asia 
was and continued to be on the radar 
of the Indonesian foreign policy. 
ASEAN was seen as the main venue 
where Indonesia articulated its 
foreign policy interests.’31 
Thus, Indonesia should mediate the issue 
of the South China Sea between claimants 
so that it could be resolved peacefully to 
prevent division between ASEAN member 
states as soon as possible. Mediating the 
South China Sea dispute can benefit 
                                                 
30
 Syamsul Hadi, ‘Defending ASEAN’s 
“Centrality”: Indonesia and the Politics of East 
Asian Regional Architecture in the Post-
American Financial Crisis Era’, in China and 
East Asia: After the Wall Street Crisis, eds. 
Peng er Lam, Yaqing Qin, Mu Yang, Series on 
Contemporary China Vol. 33 (Singapore: 
World Scientific, 2013), p. 195. 
31
 Bantaro Bandoro, ‘Indonesian Foreign Policy 
2008 and beyond’, Indonesia Quarterly 35, No. 
4 (2007): 327. 
Indonesia’s reputation greatly as a growing 
regional power. Furthermore, Indonesia 
had already done enough to have the 
integrity and credibility as a mediator to 
solve the South China Sea dispute. The 
perception of Indonesia as one of the 
regional leader has been there the whole 
time. For example, in September 2010, 
Malaysian authorities detained three 
Indonesian civilian officials in Bintan 
waters.
32
 Rather than showing hard action, 
Indonesian government only sent a mere 
diplomatic note to protest the action in the 
midst of parliament and public anger.
33
 
President Yudhoyono stated that Indonesia 
should be an example for the rest of 
ASEAN members. Moreover, Indonesia 
has helped a lot to defuse the tension with 
a series of informal negotiations among 
South China Sea claimants for more than 
two decades since the 1990s, although it is 
                                                 
32
 Lilian Budianto, ‘Malaysia ‘violates Indonesia 
territory, sovereignty’’, Jakarta Post (2010), 
<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/08
/19/malaysia-%E2%80%98violates-
indonesian-territory-
sovereignty%E2%80%99.html> (accessed on 
26 December 2013). 
33
 Hadi, ‘Indonesia, ASEAN, and the Rise of 
China’, p. 155. 
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all no to its avail. This includes 
Indonesia’s ‘shuttle diplomacy’, thanks to 
Foreign Minister Natalegawa, which 
resulted in a face-saving ‘common 
position’ that reiterated ASEAN’s 
adherence to the declaration of conduct in 
South China and UNCLOS by visiting five 
capital cities (Manila, Hanoi, Bangkok, 
Phnom Penh, and Singapore) over two 
days period.
34
 Furthermore, Indonesia’s 
‘free and active’ policy, ASEAN’s 
‘Centrality’, and the Natalegawa’s doctrine 
are the principles of Indonesia’s foreign 
policy, which would not let itself to 
become a proxy to external pressure and 
power. Therefore, Indonesia is the perfect 
mediator between the claimant states in the 
South China Sea dispute. 
 
 
                                                 
34
 Bagus Saragih, ‘RI finds Common ASEAN 
ground in sea dispute’, Jakarta Post (2012), 
<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/07
/23/ri-finds-common-asean-ground-sea-
dispute.html> (accessed on 24 December 
2013). 
Towards a Solution? Policy 
Recommendations 
Although since 1990s Indonesia has not 
been able to mediate the issue in South 
China Sea, a new opportunity has come. 
Since the election of Xi Jinping as 
president by the National People’s 
Congress in March, there has been a re-
evaluation of Beijing’s counter-productive 
policy towards the South China Sea. 
Moreover, China’s new Foreign minister, 
Wang Yi, a veteran diplomat with 
extensive experience in Southeast Asia, 
seems eager to revitalize the relation 
between China and ASEAN.
35
 Xi Jinping 
visits to Southeast Asian countries shoed 
the willingness of China to settle the 
dispute peacefully though talks. Xi stated 
in his speech during Indonesia’s visit that 
China and the 10-member of ASEAN 
nations should settle territorial and 
                                                 
35
 Charlyle Thayer, ‘New Commitment to a Code 
of Conduct in the South China Sea?’, The 
National Bureau of Asian Research Website 
(2013), 
<http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id
=360#.UnEeZflmh8E> (accessed on 28 
December 2013). 
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maritime disputes ‘in a peaceful manner so 
as to safeguard regional stability and 
peace.
36
 He further added that ‘China 
attaches great importance to Indonesia’s 
role in ASEAN and is ready to work 
together with Indonesia and other ASEAN 
countries to make the two sides share the 
same prosperity’.37 Li Mingjiang, analyst 
at S. Rajaratnam School of International 
Studies, said that Xi’s tone was one of 
openness, reinforcing his more 
accommodative and relaxed attitude to the 
dispute.
38
 He further noted, ‘This shift is 
already taking place – we haven’t seen any 
aggressive patrolling in the South China 
Sea since Xi took the leadership’.39 
Furthermore, Hung and Lee has argued 
that regarding the dispute in the South 
China Sea, China has adopted the policy of 
‘leaving conflicts aside and jointly 
                                                 
36
 Yahoo News, ‘China’s Xi urges improved 
SEAsia ties in Indonesia speech’, Yahoo 
(2013), 
<http://au.news.yahoo.com/world/a/19235547/
chinas-xi-urges-improved-seasia-ties-in-
indonesia-speech/> (accessed on 25 December 
2013) 
37
Ibid. 
38
Ibid. 
39
Ibid. 
develop’ as a way for resolving conflict’ 
with three main goals: (i) reduce great 
power influence in the region; (ii) maintain 
a stable neighbourhood; and (iii) protect 
Chinese sovereignty in the South China 
Sea.
40
 
The wind has also change within ASEAN. 
The 2013 ASEAN meeting started with 
discussion with China on a Code of 
Conduct with Brunei assuming the 
ASEAN chair and Vietnamese diplomat 
Le Luong Minh as the new ASEAN 
secretary general.
41
 Wisdom believes that 
the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia 
have been particularly keen to use 
ASEAN-derived regional diplomacy to 
embed China in a regional multilateral 
maritime consensus.
42
 Importantly, 
Cambodia has ceased its obstruction of 
                                                 
40
 Hung Ming-Te and Lee Mei-Hsien, ‘China’s 
Relations with Southeast Asia (ASEAN)’, in 
The Ashgate Research Companion to Chinese 
Foreign Policy, ed. Emilian Kavalski 
(Burlington: Ashgate, 2012), p. 254. 
41
 Thayer, ‘New Commitment to a Code of 
Conduct in the South China Sea?’. 
42
  Sheldon Simon, ‘Conflict and Diplomacy in the 
South China Sea: The View from 
Washington’, Asian Survey 52, No. 6 (2012): 
1000. 
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ASEAN effort to maintain unified position 
on the issue.
43
 Thus, Indonesia should use 
this momentum as an opportunity to 
engage in a proactive diplomacy in settling 
the issue. 
It is Indonesia’s top and foremost priority 
to maintain a united ASEAN and prevent 
further regional conflicts. It is also within 
Indonesia’s main interest to prevent further 
tension in the South China Sea with China. 
In achieving this condition, this paper will 
propose the following recommendations. 
Firstly, talks should be intensified between 
ASEAN and China through formal or 
informal meetings. However, the problem 
is China want to solve the issue bilaterally. 
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman 
Jiang Yu stressed the PRC’s ‘great 
concern about any possible announcement 
made by ASEAN countries . . . we oppose 
the internationalization and 
multilateralization, or expansion of the 
                                                 
43
Ibid. 
issue’.44 This is a great obstacle in 
achieving a united ASEAN position on the 
issue. Therefore, Indonesia and ASEAN 
should assure China that ASEAN is a 
coalition which goal is to create stability 
and peace in the region. The same should 
be one to every ASEAN member states. 
Indonesia should always remind ASEAN 
claimant states that there is a need to 
accept that China’s military growth is 
natural, legitimate outcome of its growing 
economy. Thus, by doing this, Indonesia 
should ease the tension in the region and 
achieves what Phillips said as ‘stable 
security architecture with the participation 
and support of Asia’s increasingly 
assertive middle-power’.45 Through these 
intensified talks, hopefully there will be 
more cooperative activities and 
confidence-building measures which 
would create a more comfortable 
environment to conclude a Code of 
                                                 
44
 David Scott, ‘Conflict Irresolution in the South 
China Sea, Asian Survey 52, No. 6 (2012): 
1023. 
45
 Andrew Phillips, ‘From the Age of Asymmetry 
to the Great Reconvergence: Securing Order in 
the Asian Century’, Australian Journal of 
International Affairs 65, No. 1 (2011): 96. 
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Conduct on the sea. As argued by Mikael 
Weissmann, ‘the proliferation of elite 
interactions, in particular track two 
diplomacy and personal networks, has 
been important for peace building and 
conflict prevention in the South China 
Sea’.46 
Aside from talks between states elites, 
Indonesia should encourage more frequent 
talks on conflict and maritime 
management by experts. In Indonesia, the 
talk was first initiated when former 
Ambassador Hasjim Djalal initiated 
Indonesian-sponsored ‘Workshops on 
Managing Potential Conflicts in the South 
China Sea’.47 This workshop has also 
spawned a number of environmental 
projects looking at ecosystem monitoring, 
biodiversity, sea level, tide monitoring, as 
well as maritime matters such as safety of 
                                                 
46
 Mikael Weissmann, Understanding the East 
Asian Peace: Informal and Formal Conflict 
Prevention and Peace Building in the Taiwan 
Strait, The Korean Peninsula, and the South 
China Sea 1990-2008 (Sweden: University of 
Gothenburg Press, 2009), p. 127. 
47
 Scott, p. 1021. 
navigation, shipping and communication.
48
 
Across Southeast Asia, Singapore, 
Malaysia and China has done conferences 
since 2007, all on the topics of marine 
biodiversity, environmental change, and 
maritime communities on the South China 
Sea.
49
 
Secondly, Indonesia should encourage a 
unified ASEAN position on this issue, 
particularly against China whose power is 
chasing that of the US. Small- and middle-
powers occupy a secondary, subordinate 
position on the international stage; if they 
are to exercise influence at all, it is by 
forming a coalition of like-minded states 
to pursue common goals.
50
 This point 
should be underscored to prevent divided 
positions within ASEAN. Furthermore, 
Indonesia should always put forward the 
ASEAN’s Six-Point principles on the 
South China Sea and the commitment to 
the full implementation of Declaration of 
                                                 
48
Ibid. 
49
Ibid. 
50
 Michael Wesley, There Goes the 
Neighbourhood: Australian and the Rise of 
Asia (Sydney: New South, 2011), p. 169. 
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Conduct. Again, Indonesia should assure 
China not to worry too much if ASEAN is 
united on the issue of South China Sea, by 
reminding China that a unified ASEAN 
will not be a disadvantage. Kishore 
Mahbubani, a former Singaporean 
diplomat, stated ‘China’s previous leaders 
had always calculated that a strong and 
unified ASEAN is a valuable buffer 
against possible US containment strategy. 
By dividing ASEAN, China has provided 
America with the best possible geopolitical 
opportunity in the region’.51 
Thirdly, a new dialogue mechanism is also 
worth to be considered. For example, 
Bonnie Glaser recommended a South 
China Sea Coast Guard Forum, modelled 
after the North Pacific Coast Guard 
Forum, which cooperates on a multitude of 
maritime security and legal issues and 
could enhance cooperation through 
                                                 
51
 Kishore Mahbubani, ‘Is China Losing the 
Diplomatic Plot’, Project Syndicate website 
(2012), <http://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/is-china-losing-the-
diplomatic-plot> (accessed on 24 December 
2013) 
information-sharing.
52
 This would provide 
a platform which could improve awareness 
and communication between claimant 
states. Indonesia should put this forward 
on the next ASEAN multilateral meeting 
with China and make a supporting case to 
gain approval from all parties. 
Fourthly, Indonesia should remind the 
United States not to encourage the 
claimants to engage in confrontational 
behaviour through a provocative response. 
For example, when former Secretary of 
States in 2011 unintendedly refer the 
South China Sea as the West Philippine 
Sea which consequently embolden Manila 
to antagonize China rather than seeking a 
peaceful mechanism to settle the 
differences.
53
 Indonesia should remind the 
US that China has been very sensitive to 
US involvement on every regional dispute 
that China has at the moment with its 
                                                 
52
 Bonnie Glaser, ‘Armed Clash in the South China 
Sea’, Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 
14, Council on Foreign Relations (2012): 6, 
downloadable at 
<http://www.cfr.org/world/armed-clash-south-
china-sea/p27883>. 
53
Ibid. 
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neighbours. Moreover, Indonesia should 
assure the United States that Indonesia and 
ASEAN will prioritise the implementation 
of resolution on the dispute and ask it to be 
an observer, not a player, on the dispute 
and restrain itself from making negative 
sentiments that could disturb the regional 
efforts towards a solution which could be 
done through bilateral meeting, diplomatic 
letter or private diplomatic channel. 
Finally, this paper has provided an analysis 
of South China Sea dispute which has 
created a crack to the unity of ASEAN. 
The great economic stake in the South 
China Sea has made neighbouring 
countries to compete to get the resources 
in the disputed area. The centrality and 
unity of ASEAN is threatened by foreign 
power’s intervention. Further tension in 
South China Sea could spark a possible 
conflict in the area. Therefore, Indonesia 
should act as a mediating country to solve 
the dispute as soon as possible. These four 
policy recommendation would hopefully 
help to solve the dispute in the South 
China Sea. They will serve Indonesia’s 
interest in maintaining a stable regional 
order in Southeast Asia and future conflict 
with China. These recommendations 
emphasize greatly on the measure of 
confidence-building and the realization of 
Code of Conduct. It is very possible for 
Indonesia to lead ASEAN to maintain 
stability as long as diplomacy and talks 
comes first rather than showing muscles 
and Indonesia’s supportive role as a 
mediator is very important in achieving 
this. If dispute in the South China Sea can 
be settled peacefully with Indonesia as the 
mediator, we would achieve high 
credibility in front of international 
community, which is needed as Indonesia 
is a country with large population and 
rapidly growing economy. Furthermore, 
consequently ASEAN will also take credit 
as a model regional bloc that successfully 
put their differences aside to settle a 
regional dispute with greater power. 
Moreover, ASEAN will become more 
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unified after this issue, which very much 
suit Indonesia’s foreign policy interest. 
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